The Unraveling of the McDonnell Douglas Framework in Title VII Discrimination Cases
Florida Supreme Court Certified Circuit Civil Mediator
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On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling on a reverse discrimination case, Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, clarifying the varying
application of the McDonnell Douglas framework and evidentiary standards applied to discrimination cases.
Petitioner Ames, a heterosexual woman, worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004. In her long tenure she held many positions and in 2019, she applied for a new management position with her new supervisor, a homosexual woman. She did not get the position, and they hired a different candidate, a lesbian woman. Ames was subsequently demoted from her program administrator position to a clerical position, and they hired a homosexual man to fill that position. In response to these employment actions, Ames filed a lawsuit against the agency under Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation. The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit held, applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, that the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive. Like the District Court, the Sixth Circuit held that Ames failed to meet her prima facie burden because she had not shown background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. 87 F. 4th 822, 825. The court reasoned that Ames, a heterosexual, was required to make this showing in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima facie case. Thus, applying a heightened evidentiary standard. The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, finding disparity in the application of the disparate treatment of majority-group members.
Title VII s disparate-treatment provision bars employers from intentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U. S. C. 2000e 2(a)(1). In McDonnell Douglas, this Court laid out a three-step burden-shifting framework for evaluating claims arising under that provision. 411 U. S., at 802 804. The McDonnell Douglas framework aims to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ultimate question in a disparate-treatment case namely, whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253.2
At the first step of the three-prong test, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by producing enough evidence to support an inference of discriminatory motive. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 802. If the plaintiff meets this burden, then it shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee s rejection. Ibid. If the employer effectively argues a justified reason for such action, the plaintiff must then have a fair opportunity to show that the stated justification was in fact pretext for discrimination. Ibid at 804.
Justice Jackson authored the opinion, and taking into consideration the Supreme Court s precedent, found the Sixth Circuit s background circumstances contradicted the written text of Title VII and longstanding precedent ruling Title VII s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group and minority-group plaintiffs, unraveling McDonnell s application. In her opinion, Justice Jackson, stated a plaintiff may succeed [under the McDonnell Douglas framework] either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450 U. S., at 256.
For most plaintiffs, the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the prima facie burden is not onerous. Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253. A plaintiff may satisfy it simply by presenting evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Ibid. But, under Sixth Circuit precedent, plaintiffs who are members of a majority-group bear an additional burden at step one: They must also establish background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. 87 F. 4th, at 825.
According to the opinion of the Supreme Court in Ames, as a textual matter, Title VII s disparate-treatment provision does not distinguish between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. Instead, the provision makes it unlawful to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U. S. C. 2000e 2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Court further stated that by establishing the same protections for every individual without regard to that individual s membership in a minority-group or majority-group Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.
In her detailed opinion, with Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas concurring, Judge Jackson further elaborated on the background circumstances rule finding that it also ignores the Court s instruction to avoid inflexible applications of McDonnell Douglas s first prong. The Court has repeatedly explained that the precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the context and were never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.
In McDonnell Douglas itself, often the facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and that the prima facie proof required can therefore differ from case to case. 411 U. S., at 802, n. 13. The background circumstances rule disregards this admonition by uniformly subjecting all majority-group plaintiffs to the same, highly specific evidentiary standard in every case. As the Sixth Circuit observed, the rule effectively requires majority-group plaintiffs (and only majority-group plaintiffs) to produce certain types of evidence such as statistical proof or information about the relevant decisionmaker s protected traits that would not otherwise be required to make out a prima facie case. 87 F. 4th, at 825. The Supreme Court has long rejected such inflexible formulation[s] of the prima facie standard in disparate-treatment cases according to precedent. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358 (1977).
In conclusion, this ruling by the Supreme Court may likely increase filings of reverse-discrimination cases, although it is too early to tell. Some speculate that DEI programs create overt discrimination, as stated by Justice Thomas in his dissent, which may contribute to an increase in litigation. What we can say for certain is that the McDonnell framework is slowly unraveling to the extent that the lower courts broad interpretation and increased heightened evidentiary requirements have once and for all been deemed inapplicable.
With increased case filings, increased verdicts may follow. We have already seen a few nuclear verdicts in rare reverse discrimination cases filed by majority-group members. One in particular, Phillips v. Starbucks (see https://mediationworksfl.com/starbucks-grande-mistake/) comes to mind and is the perfect example of an unanticipated award. The jury ruled in favor of the Plaintiff and found $600,000.00 in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages for an aggregate verdict of $25.6 million dollars; a Grande’ mistake.
As a neutral, an effective mediation could provide a best of both worlds resolution. By foregoing protracted litigation with high costs and time-consuming discovery, a strong experienced neutral like myself, will help both parties weigh the options of litigation, and the risk of a potential nuclear verdict verses a cost and time saving reasonable resolution. I am available to mediate or arbitrate with you to achieve an effective resolution for all. Remember MediationWorks because mediation works!